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Abstract
The issue of whether higher lifetime income households save a larger fraction of
their income is an important factor in the evaluation of tax and macroeconomic policy. 
Despite an outpouring of research on this topic in the 1950s and 1960s, the question
remains unresolved and has since received little attention.  This paper revisits the
issue, using new empirical methods and the Panel Study on Income Dynamics, the
Survey of Consumer Finances, and the Consumer Expenditure Survey.  We first
consider the various ways in which life cycle models can be altered to generate
differences in saving rates by income groups: differences in Social Security benefits,
different time preference rates, non-homothetic preferences, bequest motives,
uncertainty, and consumption floors.  Using a variety of instruments for lifetime income,
we find a strong positive relationship between personal saving rates and lifetime
income.  The data do not support theories relying on time preference rates, non-
homothetic preferences, or variations in Social Security benefits.  Instead, the evidence
is consistent with models in which precautionary saving and bequest motives drive
variations in saving rates across income groups.  Finally, we illustrate how models that
assume a constant rate of saving across income groups can yield erroneous
predictions. 
We thank Dan Bergstresser, Wynn Huang, Julie Kozack, Stephen Lin, Byron Lutz, and Marta Noguer for
research assistance, Orazio Attanasio for help with the CEX data, and Andrew Samwick for help with
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those of the Federal Reserve Board or its staff.  This version is the same as NBER working paper
no. 7906 (September 2000).
1 Blinder (1975) finds little connection between shifts in the income distribution and the aggregate
saving rate, but argues that the changes in the income distribution present in postwar U.S. data are
unlikely to correspond to the type of pure redistribution required by the theory. 
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I.  Introduction
It would be easy to convince a room full of non-economists that higher lifetime
income levels lead to higher saving rates.  Non-economists would tell you that low
income people can't afford to save.  Certainly a room full of journalists would need little
convincing: Examples include "A sales tax would shift the tax burden from the rich to
the middle class, since affluent people save a much larger portion of their earnings"
(Passell, New York Times, 1995), and  "The poor and middle class spend a higher
percentage of their income on goods than do the rich, and so, according to most
economists' studies, a value-added tax is regressive" (Greenhouse, New York Times,
1992). 
A room full of economists would be less easily persuaded that higher lifetime
income levels lead to higher saving rates.  The typical economist would point out that
people with temporarily high income will tend to save more to compensate for lower
future income, and people with temporarily low income will tend to save less in
anticipation of higher future income.  Thus, even if the saving rate is invariant with
regard to lifetime income, we will observe people with high current incomes saving more
than their lower income brethren (Friedman, 1957).
Moreover, the stylized facts about the aggregate U.S. saving rate do not seem to
support a positive correlation between saving rates and income.  First, there has been
no time-series increase in the aggregate saving rate during the past century despite
dramatic growth in real per capita income.  Second, the increasing concentration of
income toward the top income quintile during the 1980s and early 1990s did not lead to
higher aggregate saving rates.1  Looking across countries, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven
(2000) found no evidence of a statistically significant link between measures of income
inequality and aggregate saving rates.
Despite an outpouring of research in the 1950s and 1960s, the question of
whether the rich save more has since received little attention.  Much of the early
empirical work favored the view that high income people did in fact save a higher
2 One can assume a representative agent because the marginal and average propensities to save
from lifetime income are identical for all individuals in the economy.  See Caselli and Ventura (1999) for a
more general model in which individual consumption is a linear function of income and wealth, thus
retaining desirable aggregation properties.  
3 See, for example, Stoker (1986).
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fraction of their income (e.g., Mayer, 1966, 1972).  However, a sufficient number of
studies, by Milton Friedman and others, reached the opposite conclusion to leave
“reasonable doubt” about the alleged propensity of high lifetime income households to
save more.
We return to the topic of how saving rates vary with lifetime income for two
reasons.  First, the empirical issues remain somewhat clouded, and a wide variety of
newer data sources, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF), the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), and work on
imputed saving from Social Security and pension contributions (Feldstein and Samwick,
1992; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1989) allow a much richer picture of empirical patterns
of saving behavior.  Second, we believe that the topic has important implications for the
evaluation of economic policy.  If Milton Friedman and his collaborators did not earn a
clear-cut victory in the empirical battles of the 1960s, they won the war.  Many models
used for macroeconomic or microeconomic policy evaluation assume that saving is
proportional to lifetime resources, which allows the distribution of heterogeneous people
with different incomes to be collapsed into a single “representative” agent.2  The Leeper
and Sims (1994) macroeconomic policy model, and the work by Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987) on tax incidence analysis are examples of such models.
The question we are examining bears on a number of important issues.  First, a
finding of heterogeneous saving rates would suggest that the effects on aggregate
consumption of shocks to aggregate income or wealth would depend not only on the
magnitude of the shock but also on its distribution across income groups.3  Second, the
results could shed light on the debate in the economic growth literature about whether
the positive correlation between income and saving rates across countries reflects high
saving rates causing high income or vice versa.  Third, the results could help us
understand how the degree of preparedness for retirement varies across earnings
3groups.  Fourth, the incidence and effectiveness of reform proposals that shift taxation
away from saving (such as value-added taxes, consumption taxes, flat taxes, and
expanded IRAs) depend on how much saving is done by each income group.  Finally,
the question of whether higher income households save at higher rates than lower
income households has important implications for the distribution of wealth, both within
and across cohorts.
We find first, like previous researchers, a strong positive relationship between
current income and saving rates across all income groups, including the very highest
income categories.  Second, and more important, we continue to find a positive
correlation when we use proxies for permanent income such as education, lagged and
future earnings, the value of vehicles purchased, and food consumption.  Estimated
saving rates range from less than 5 percent for the bottom quintile of the income
distribution to more than 40 percent of income for the top 5 percent.  The positive
relationship is more pronounced when we include imputed Social Security saving and
pension contributions.  Even among the elderly, saving rates may rise with income.  In
sum, our results suggest strongly that the rich do save more, whether the rich are
defined to be the top 20 percent of the income distribution (following the Department of
Treasury -- Pines, 1997), or the top 1 percent.  And, more broadly, we find that saving
rates increase across the entire income distribution. 
These basic patterns of saving are not consistent with the predictions of
standard homothetic life-cycle models.  Nor, as we show below, are they consistent with
explanations that range from differences in time preference rates or subsistence
parameters to variation in Social Security replacement rates.  Rather, we conclude that
the data are consistent with a model that emphasizes the dual role for saving later in
life: money is set aside for catastrophic expenditures such as a costly illness or other
contingency, and, in the likely case that the money is not needed for such an event, it is
passed along to heirs (see also Smith, 1999a).  This combination of precautionary and
bequest motives stimulates saving most for higher income households, and has less
effect on lower income households, perhaps because of asset-based means tested
social insurance programs, like Medicaid, or less desire to leave financial bequests to
subsequent generations (e.g. Becker and Tomes, 1986 and Mulligan, 1997).  As well as
4explaining the cross-sectional pattern in saving, such a model also implies that steady-
state saving rates should remain constant over time despite long-term income growth.  
In the next section, we consider models of consumption that allow for systematic
differences in saving behavior by lifetime income group.  Section III describes the
empirical methodology, focusing on the key issue of identification of permanent income. 
In Section IV, we describe the three data sets used for the analysis.  Our empirical
results are in Section V, and Section VI concludes. 
II.  The Empirical and Theoretical Background
Many economists in previous generations used both theory and empirics to
assess whether people with high incomes save more than people with low incomes. 
Early theoretical contributions include Fisher (1930), Keynes (1936), Hicks (1950), and
Pigou (1951); early empirical work includes Vickrey (1947), Duesenberry (1949),
Friedman (1957), Friend and Kravis (1957), Modigliani and Ando (1960), and many
more.
In his work on the permanent income hypothesis, Friedman (1957) noted that
cross-sectional data show a positive correlation between income and saving rates, but
argued that this result reflected individuals changing their saving in order to keep
consumption smooth in the face of temporarily high or low income.  He contended that
individuals with high permanent income consume the same fraction of permanent
income as individuals with low permanent income, and he emphasized empirical
regularities that appeared to support this proportionality hypothesis.  Many studies of
this hypothesis followed, some supporting Friedman and some not.  Evans (1969)
summarized the state of knowledge about consumption in 1969, concluding "it is still an
open question whether relatively wealthy individuals save a greater proportion of their
income than do relatively poor individuals" (p. 14).
In a comprehensive examination of the available results and data, Mayer (1972)
disagreed, claiming strong evidence against the proportionality hypothesis.  For
example, when he proxied for permanent income and consumption with five-year
averages from annual Swiss budget surveys, he found the elasticity of consumption
with respect to permanent income to be significantly different from one (0.905), and not
4 See Browning and Lusardi (1996) for a survey of recent micro-level empirical research on
saving. 
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(1)
much different from the elasticity based on one year of income.  Mayer interpreted this
result as a rejection of the proportionality hypothesis.
Despite the abundance of early studies on this important question, little work has
been done since.  The relative lack of interest in part reflects the influential work of
Lucas (1976) and Hall (1978), which shifted work away from learning about levels of
consumption or saving toward "Euler Equation" estimation techniques that implicitly
examine first differences in consumption.4
Some studies have found that wealth levels are disproportionately higher among
households with high lifetime income (Diamond and Hausman,1984; Bernheim and
Scholz, 1993; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995).  While this result could be
explained by higher saving rates among higher income households, it could also be
explained by higher rates of return (on housing or the stock market, for example) or the
receipt of proportionately more intergenerational transfers by these households.  Others
have argued that wealth levels when properly measured are not disproportionately
higher among high income households.  Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) and Venti and
Wise (1998) augmented conventionally measured wealth with imputed Social Security
and pension wealth from the Health and Retirement Survey; they found that the ratio of
this augmented wealth to lifetime earnings (based on lengthy Social Security records)
was constant or even declining with lifetime earnings.  As we show below, these
seemingly contradictory results illustrate the importance of how one measures lifetime
income and the distinction between flows (saving) and stocks (wealth).  
To help make the question more precise, consider a life-cycle / permanent
income model with a bequest motive.  At each age t, households maximize expected
lifetime utility
where E is the expectation operator, C*is is non-medical consumption for household i at
5 Note that since r includes the total return to non-human wealth including capital gains, saving
measured as income minus consumption is identical to saving measured as the change in wealth.  We
return to this issue below.
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(2)
(3)
time s, *i  is the household-specific rate of time preference, Bis is the bequest left in the
event of death, and V(") is the utility of leaving a bequest.  To allow for mortality risk, Bis
is the probability (as of time t) of dying in period s, Dis is a state variable that is equal to
one if the household is alive through period s and zero otherwise, and T is the
maximum possible length of life.
The family begins period s with net worth (exclusive of human wealth)
Ais-1(1+ris-1), where ris-1 is the real after-tax rate of return on non-human wealth between
s-1 and s.  We assume that there are no private annuity markets.  The family first
learns about medical expenses (Mis), which we treat as necessary consumption that
generates no utility.  It next receives transfers (TRis) from the government.  It then
learns whether it survives through the period.  If not, it leaves to heirs a non-negative
bequest,
If it survives, the household receives after-tax earnings (Eis) and chooses non-medical
consumption.  We define total consumption as Cis / C*is + Mis.  End of period wealth
(Ais) is thus:  
We define real annual income Yis / ris-1 Ais-1 + Eis + TRis, and saving as Sis / Yis - Cis =
Ais - Ai s-1.
5
Define lifetime resources (as of period s) as period s non-human wealth plus the
expected present value of future earnings and transfers.  Under what circumstances will
consumption (and saving) be proportional to lifetime resources?  In a world with no
uncertainty and no bequest motive, two sets of assumptions will generate
proportionality in consumption.  First, if the rate of time preference (*i) and the rate of
return (ris) are constant and equal to each other, any separable utility function will yield
constant consumption over the lifetime, equal to the appropriate annuity factor
6 Adding uncertainty complicates the model, but again two sets of assumptions will generate the
result that consumption rises proportionately with the scale factor for earnings.  First, if the utility function
is quadratic and *i and ris are constant and equal to each other, consumption will be proportional to the
expected value of lifetime resources, as defined above.  If the utility function is not quadratic then there is
no single summary statistic that defines consumption.  However, if one assumes the utility function is
isoelastic and initial wealth and all possible realizations of earnings are scaled up by a constant factor,
then consumption will also be scaled up by that factor and saving rates will be identical (Bar-Ilan, 1995).
7 Our discussion and empirical estimates focus on differences in the average propensity to save
across income levels.  Some, but not all, of the explanations below would also generate differences in the
marginal propensity to save. 
8 The only purpose of the third period is to allow for medical expenses late in life – we assume no
non-medical consumption in this period.
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multiplied by lifetime resources.  Second, if preferences are homothetic, i.e. the utility
function is isoelastic: U(C) = (C1-( -1)/(1-(), consumption will be proportional to lifetime
resources.  If all households have the same preference parameters and face the same
interest rates, then the constant of proportionality will be the same for all households.  If
one further assumes that the initial wealth and the age-earnings (and age-transfers)
profiles of rich households are simply scaled-up versions of those for poor households,
then the proportionality in consumption implies that saving rates will be identical across
households.6
How then could saving rates differ across income groups?  We consider three
general classes of models: one encompasses certainty models without a bequest
motive, the second allows for uncertainty with respect to future income or health
expenses (but no bequest motive), and the third includes an operative bequest motive.7  
To provide illustrative calculations of how saving rates differ across income
groups in these classes of models, we present results from a simple three-period
version of the model above.  We think of period one (“young”) as ages 30-60, period
two (“old”) as ages 60-90, and period three as the time around death (when old) when
medical expenditures are paid and bequests are left.8  We assume an isoelastic utility
function with ( = 3, a value consistent with previous studies.  Further details are
provided below.
A.  Consumption models with no uncertainty and no bequest motive
We begin with a model with no bequest motive and no uncertainty other than
9 We set the probability of living to old age (period 2) at 82 percent, based on statistics from the
Berkeley mortality database; http://demog.berkeley.edu/wilmoth/mortality/overview.html.  Since period 3
represents the very end of life, all households that survive to period 2 die in period 3.
10 Other examples (for which similar exercises could be performed) include: 1) differences in the
timing of earnings (higher income households tend to have a steeper age-earnings profile, inducing them
to save less when young than lower income households), 2) differences in life expectancy (higher income
households tend to live longer, inducing them to save more when young than lower income households),
or 3) differences in retirement age (higher income households tend to retire later, inducing them to save
less when young). 
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about the length of life.9  We examine two income groups, low income and high income,
with assumed average first-period income of $16,116 and $75,000, based on the 20th
and 80th percentile of the income distribution in 1998 (U.S. Census, 1999).  We assume
that in the second period Social Security and pension income replace 60 percent of pre-
retirement (or first-period) income, consistent with the overall replacement rate in
Gustman and Steinmeier (1999).  The (annual) rates of time preference and interest
are 0.02 and 0.03, respectively, which, together with uncertain lifespan, result in a
roughly flat pattern of non-medical consumption over the lifetime.   
In table 1, we present the predicted saving rates for working age (young) and
retirement age (old) households.  The results are identical for the low income and high
income groups, with saving rates while young equal to 12.5 percent in addition to
pensions and Social Security, and dissaving rates while old equal to 16.0 percent. 
In the standard life cycle model, there are two approaches to generating higher
saving rates for higher income households: differences in the timing of income for these
households and differences in the timing of consumption.  We consider each in turn.
Differences in the timing of earnings and transfers across lifetime income groups
will yield different patterns of saving despite identical slopes of the consumption paths. 
For example, Social Security programs typically provide a higher replacement rate for
low income households and thus reduce the need for these households to save for
retirement (e.g., Huggett and Ventura, 2000; Smith, 1999a).10  We consider the effects
in our model of increasing the replacement rate for the low income households from 60
percent to 75 percent (and increasing first period Social Security taxes for these
households such that the present value of lifetime resources is unaffected).  Table 1
shows that the saving rate while young falls, to just 6.7 percent.  Saving rates while old
Table 1: Simulated Saving Patterns
Saving Rate of
Young
Saving Rate
of OId
Benchmark 
Low income 12.5 -16.0
High Income 12.5 -16.0
Income Replacement Rate:
75 Percent for Low Income
60 Percent for High Income
Low Income 6.7 -7.5
High Income 12.5 -16.0
Time preference rate:
5 Percent for Low Income
2 Percent for High Income
Low Income 5.4 -8.0
High Income 12.5 -16.0
Income and Medical Care
Uncertainty
Low Income 14.8 -15.1
High Income 14.0 -16.8
Income and Medical Care
Uncertainty with
Consumption Floor ($12,500)
Low Income 0.0 0.0
High Income 14.0 -16.8
Bequest Motive (:=1)
Low Income 12.5 -16.1
High Income 15.4 -7.9
Income and Medical Care
Uncertainty, Consumption
Floor, and Bequest Motive
Low Income 0.0 0.0
High Income  16.4 -7.6
Default parameters: 2 percent time preference rate, 82 percent chance of surviving to be “old,” 60
percent replacement rate, 3 percent interest rate. 
11 Define Social Security saving equal to the present value of future Social Security benefits
accrued as a result of Social Security contributions in period 1.  The modified saving rate adds Social
Security saving to both the numerator (saving) and the denominator (income).
12 This assumes that consumption would be unaffected by the change.  If this “forced saving”
lowered the consumption while young, it would raise the comprehensive saving of low income households.
13 Lawrance (1991) offers empirical evidence to this effect, although Dynan (1994) shows that the
patterns are not pronounced after controlling for ex-post shocks to income.  See also Bernheim, Skinner,
and Weinberg (1997).
9
increase to -7.5 percent.  In other words, if lower income households have higher
retirement replacement rates then they will save less while working, and dissave less
while retired.  Suppose that we were to instead construct a more comprehensive saving
rate inclusive of “Social Security saving”.11  This saving rate would equal 12.5 percent,
identical to the saving rate for high income households.12  In other words, if a Social
Security program of the type presented here is causing saving rates to decline with
income, the comprehensive saving rate would show no such decline. We construct this
comprehensive saving measure in our empirical work below.  Note that if we were to
change the model so that the Social Security program provided future benefits to low
income households greater (in present value) than the contributions (making it
progressive), then the comprehensive saving measure would show saving rates of the
low income working households that were greater than saving rates of the high income
households. 
Next consider differences in the timing of consumption.  If high income
households choose more rapid growth rates in consumption, they will have higher
saving rates, at least at younger ages.13  For example, a negative relationship between
the time preference rate * and the level of income could lead higher income
households to have steeper consumption paths.  This might happen in a world with
imperfect capital markets because households with lower time preference rates would
have a greater inclination toward saving (when young) and would also be more likely to
have higher earnings because of greater investment in education and other forms of
14 With perfect capital markets, households with high time preference would borrow to finance
their education, yielding no relationship between time preference and years of schooling or earnings.  See,
for example, Cameron and Taber (2000). 
15 In this type of model, a third factor (the rate of time preference) is causing both the higher
permanent income and the higher saving rate. (See, for example, Evans and Montgomery, 1995, on the
correlation between different types of forward-looking behavior.)  Therefore, exogenously raising the
permanent income of a given household would not raise its saving rate.  See Mayer (1972) for further
discussion.
16 Differences across lifetime income groups in the number and/or timing of children could also
generate differences in the timing of consumption.  See Attanasio and Browning (1995) for work relating
consumption and family size. 
17 Although the need to meet the current subsistence level depresses the saving rate of lower
income households, the need to meet future requirements boosts the saving rate of those households. 
The net effect depends (in a certainty model) on the relative magnitudes of r and *.  Because of the
subsistence level, poor households will be on a more steeply sloped portion of their utility functions than
rich households.  As a result, they will be less willing to substitute consumption over time and will have
flatter consumption paths.  If r > *, the consumption paths of both rich and poor households will slope
upward, and the flatter paths of poor households will be associated with lower saving rates when young.  If
r < *, the reverse is true:  consumption paths will slope downward, and the flatter path of the poor will be
associated with a higher saving rate when young.  A different way to generate the result that higher
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human capital.14,15  Alternatively, Becker and Mulligan (1997) suggest that the causality
may run the other way, with a higher level of income encouraging people to invest
resources that make them more farsighted.  In either case, the level of lifetime earnings
would be positively correlated with both the growth rate of consumption and saving
rates while young.16
Turning back to our model, suppose that low income households have an
(annual) time preference rate of 0.05, instead of 0.02.  Table 1 shows that the resulting
saving patterns look very much like those when the income replacement rate is higher
for these households.  For low income households, the saving rate while young drops to
5.4 percent, and the saving rate while old falls to -8.0 percent.  Once again, we see
higher saving by higher income households while young but more dissaving while old.
One can also generate income-based differences in consumption growth rates
by assuming a “subsistence” or necessary level of consumption.  Informal arguments
are sometimes made that subsistence levels imply that poor households have lower
saving rates because they cannot “afford to save” after buying the necessities. 
However, this result requires that r > *; if r < *, a subsistence level of consumption
causes rich households to save less than poor households.17  Closely related are
income households have higher saving rates is to assume that subsistence levels decline with age.
18 This result presumes that substitution effects dominate income effects; see Elmendorf (1996). 
Note also that higher income households face higher marginal tax rates, lowering their after-tax return.
19 Thaler (1994) and Laibson (1997) describe a class of models in which preferences are
dynamically inconsistent.  Consumers’ desire for a high saving path is undermined by a preference for
immediate gratification.  The illiquidity of housing equity and pensions allows consumers to commit to
higher saving rates. 
20 This degree of uncertainty is consistent with empirical parameterizations of earnings variability
(e.g., Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1994).
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models in which the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is larger for high income
households (Attanasio and Browning,1995; Atkeson and Ogaki, 1996; and Ogaki,
Ostry, and Reinhard, 1996).  
Finally, the pattern could arise if higher income households enjoy better access
to investment opportunities, such as equity markets, pensions, and housing.  This may
provide them with a higher rate of return (Yitzhaki, 1987),18 or a better mechanism to
overcome their preferences for immediate gratification, as in Thaler (1994) and Laibson
(1997).19  In sum, differences in the timing of income and differences in the timing of
consumption can explain higher saving among higher income households while young,
but they also imply that these households have higher dissaving rates when old. 
 B.  Consumption models with uncertainty but no bequest motive
Does the precautionary motive for saving imply that high income households
should save more?  To answer this question, we incorporate two additional sources of
uncertainty in the model.  First, we allow for risk to second-period income that might be
associated with earnings shocks, forced early retirement, or the loss of a spouse.  We
assume a discretized distribution with an equal chance of earnings either one-quarter
higher or one-quarter lower than in the case of perfect certainty.20 
Second, we allow for the possibility of large medical expenses, especially near
death.  For example, Hurd and Wise (1989) found a decline in median wealth of
$103,134 (in 1999 dollars) for couples suffering the death of a husband, and Smith
(1999b) found that wealth fell following severe health shocks, by $25,371 for
households above median income and by $11,348 for families below median income. 
Covinsky et al (1994) found that 20 percent of a sample of families experiencing a
21 On the other hand, Hurd and Smith (1999) find smaller median changes in wealth near death.
22 We assume that the household learns about the size of medical expenses prior to choosing
second-period consumption, but does not pay the expenses until period 3.
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death from serious illness reported that the illness had essentially wiped out their
assets.21
For simplicity, we subtract medical expenditures from earnings (so that our
earnings are net of health care expenditures) in the first two periods, and focus on
uncertainty about health care expenditures only in the final period, at the very end of
life.  We assume health expenditures of $60,000 with 20 percent probability, and $0
otherwise.22  We compute the average saving rate in period 2 as average saving
divided by average income.
Table 1 shows that when these types of uncertainty are added, saving rates for
low income households are larger than for high income households.  This is because
the income uncertainty is proportional to income (raising saving rates equally for both
groups) and the health expenditures represent a higher fraction of lifetime income for
these households.  Thus, the introduction of these factors alone cannot explain why the
rich save more.
More realistically, asset-based means-tested programs such as Medicaid or SSI
may reduce the necessity of saving against such contingencies for lower income
households (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995).  Higher income households find the
consumption floor less palatable and thus continue to save against future
contingencies.  To see the implications, we add a $12,500 means-tested consumption
floor to the model:  transfers in period 2 are adjusted so as to insure that the household
will, after exhausting its other resources, be able to consume $12,500 in the second
period and pay for medical expenditures in the final period.  Because the household
receives these transfers only after spending all other assets, a high chance of
becoming eligible for transfers translates into low saving rates while young.  Table 1
shows that these programs lead low income households to have zero saving when
young (despite the fact they may well not end up on welfare), and dissave nothing when
older.  In short, the precautionary saving model with asset-based means testing implies
23 An alternative model is one in which wealth per se gives utility above and beyond the flow of
consumption it enables (Carroll, 2000).
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low saving rates among lower income households at all ages, with conventional (and
substantial) saving rates among high income households.
C. Consumption models with a bequest motive
Thus far, our model has produced only bequests that do not generate utility for
the household -- sometimes referred to as unintended or accidental bequests.  Here we
consider an operative bequest motive as in Becker and Tomes (1986) or Mulligan
(1997).  Suppose that individuals value the utility of their children and that earnings are
mean-reverting across generations.  In this case, Friedman's permanent income
hypothesis effectively applies across generations:  a household with high lifetime
income will save a higher fraction of its lifetime income in order to leave a larger
bequest to its offspring who are likely to be relatively worse off.23 
We implement this model by specifying an operative bequest function V(Bis) =
:((Bis + YL
c
is)
1-( - 1)/(1-(), where : is the tradeoff parameter between own consumption
and bequests, and YLcis  is the value of the next generation’s lifetime earnings.  We
assume complete mean reversion of earnings, so that earnings of the children are
equal to the average earnings of parents, and : = 1.0.  
Saving rates in this bequest model (without income or medical care uncertainty)
are shown in Table 1.  Saving rates while young and old are higher for the higher
income group, where the bequest motive is operative.  By contrast, lower income
households expect their children to have earnings higher than theirs, and so consume
their overall resources, yielding saving rates that are the same as for the life cycle
model.
Finally, we consider a model with income and medical care uncertainty, a
consumption floor, and an operative bequest motive.  Here, bequests are conditional on
the health and income draws, so in the good states of the world, the family leaves a
much larger bequest than in the bad states of the world.  For the high income
household, the saving rate is 16.4 percent when young and -7.6 percent when old.  For
the low income household, the saving rate is essentially zero for both periods because
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of the asset-based means testing.  Note that high-income saving rates with both
precautionary saving and a bequest motive are not that much larger than either in
isolation; this is because the saving is used for bequests in the good state of the world,
and for health expenses in the (uncommon) bad state of the world. 
III. Empirical Methodology
Three key issues arise in designing and implementing empirical tests.  The first
is how to define saving.  One approach is to consider all forms of saving including
realized and unrealized capital gains on housing, financial assets, owner-occupied
businesses, and other components of wealth.  (These capital gains should also be
added to income to be consistent with the Haig-Simon definition of full income.)  An
alternative is to examine a definition of saving that focuses on the “active” component --
that is, the difference between income exclusive of capital gains, and consumption. 
This would be the relevant one if households do not entirely “pierce the veil” of their
saving through capital gains, or if all capital gains are unanticipated at the time the
saving decision is made.  
Unfortunately, neither definition of saving is clearly superior -- it depends on the
question of interest.  For example, capital gains should be included when measuring the
adequacy of saving for retirement, but excluded when measuring the supply of loanable
funds for new investment.  We thus construct several measures of saving: the flow of
disposable income less consumption from the CEX, the change in wealth from the SCF
and PSID, and the change in wealth exclusive of capital gains and (sometimes)
inclusive of imputed Social Security and pension saving from the PSID.
The second and third key issues are how to distinguish those with high lifetime
income from those whose income is high only transitorily and how to correct for
measurement error in income.  As Friedman pointed out, these issues are intertwined:
"in any statistical analysis errors of measurement will in general be indissolubly merged
with the correctly measured transitory component" of income (Friedman, 1957, p. 29). 
When we measure saving as the residual between income and consumption,
measurement error in income (Y) will, by construction, show up as measurement error
24 Assuming a degree of independence of the measurement errors in Y and C. 
25 For early analyses using education as a proxy for permanent income, see Zellner (1960) and
Modigliani and Ando (1960).  See Mayer (1972) for a discussion of how heterogeneity in tastes for saving
can affect tests of the proportionality hypothesis.
26 If some households face binding liquidity constraints, however, consumption may be correlated
with transitory income. 
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of the same sign in saving (Y - C).24  Therefore, measurement error in income, like
transitory income, can induce a positive correlation between measured income and
saving rates even when saving rates do not actually differ across groups with different
lifetime resources.  A bias arises in the other direction when we define saving as the
change in wealth: measurement error in income enters only in the denominator,
inducing a negative correlation between measured income and the saving rate.  
To reduce the problems associated with measurement error and transitory
income, we use proxies for permanent income -- an approach with a long history
(Mayer, 1972).  We consider four instruments: consumption (total or some
components), lagged labor income, future labor income, and education.  A good
instrument for permanent income should satisfy two requirements.  First, it should be
highly correlated with true “permanent” or anticipated lifetime income at the time of the
saving decision.  Second, the instrument should be uncorrelated with the error term,
which includes measurement error and transitory income, so that it affects saving rates
only through its influence on permanent income. 
All of our instruments are likely to satisfy the first requirement.  What about the
second requirement?  The longer the lags used and the less persistent is transitory
income, the more likely that lagged and future labor income will be uncorrelated with
transitory income.  Education is appealing in this regard, because it is well measured
and stays constant over time, which minimizes its correlation with transitory income.  It
may, however, be correlated with tastes toward saving (another possible component of
the error term), or have an independent effect on saving (e.g. people may learn how to
plan or about the merits of using tax-deferred saving vehicles).25  Since consumption
reflects permanent income in standard models, it should be uncorrelated with transitory
income, and thus be an excellent instrument (see, e.g., Vickrey, 1947).26  Measurement
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error in consumption and transitory consumption will bias the estimated relationship
between saving rates and permanent income toward being negative.  However, this
bias need not invalidate our findings.  A finding that measured saving rates rise with
measured consumption, despite the induced bias in the opposite direction, would
represent strong evidence that saving rates rise with permanent income.
Most of our results are based on a two-stage estimation procedure.  In the first
stage, we regress current income on proxies for permanent income and age dummies. 
We then use the fitted values from the first-stage regression to place households into
predicted permanent income categories (typically quintiles).  In the second stage, we
estimate a median regression, with the saving rate as the dependent variable and the
predicted permanent income quintiles and age dummies as the independent variables.
We use this procedure in order to allow for non-linearities in the relationship between
saving rates and lifetime income.  We construct standard errors for the estimated
saving rates by bootstrapping the entire two-step process.  Separately, we also use
fitted permanent income (instead of fitted quintiles) as the independent variable in the
second stage, both to summarize the relationship between the variables and to provide
a simple test of whether it is positive.
IV. Data
Using the CEX, the SCF, and the PSID not only allows for different measures of
saving, but also ensures that our conclusions are not unduly influenced by the
idiosyncracies of a single data source.  For our pre-retirement analysis, we focus on
households between the ages of 30 and 59 (as of the midpoint of their participation in
each sample), with younger households excluded because they are more likely to be in
transitional stages or students.  To analyze the saving behavior of older households, we
focus, in the CEX and SCF, on households aged 70 to 79.  This reduces the potential
problems associated with comparing households before and after retirement as well as
the complications that arise for much older households.  For the PSID, we examine
households ages 62 and older, but also consider a subset of retired households.
27 Attanasio (1994) provides a comprehensive analysis of U.S. saving rate data based on the
CEX. 
28 Sabelhaus (1992) and Nelson (1994b) warn that the data on household tax payments are quite
poor.  Sabelhaus (1992) suggests estimating these payments with income and demographic information,
but we did not attempt to do so.  Inaccurate tax data will only bias our results if the degree of inaccuracy is
correlated with our instruments for permanent income.
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A. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)
The CEX has the best available data on total household consumption.27  In each
quarter since 1980, about 5000 households have been interviewed; a given household
remains in the sample for four consecutive quarters and then is rotated out and
replaced with a new household.  The survey asks for information about consumption,
demographics, and income.  
We define the saving rate for a CEX household as the difference between
consumption and after-tax income, divided by after-tax income (all in 1989 dollars). 
Consumption equals total household expenditures plus imputed rent for homeowners
minus mortgage payments, expenditures on home capital improvements, life insurance
payments, and spending on new and used vehicles.  This definition includes
expenditures for houses and vehicles as part of saving, in part in order to make the
measure of saving in the CEX closer to those in the PSID and SCF.  We use Nelson’s
(1994a) reorganization of the CEX, which sums consumption across the four interview
quarters for households in the 1982 through 1989 waves.  After-tax income equals
pre-tax income for the previous year less taxes for this period, as reported in each
household's final interview.28  We deflate both income and consumption with price
indexes based in 1989.  Appendix A includes the definitions of all other variables we
use.
We exclude households with nonpositive disposable income so that negative
saving rates occur only when consumption exceeds income.  We also exclude
households with income below $1000, as well as households with invalid income or
missing age data, and households who did not participate for all of the interviews.  We
are left with 14,180 households for our analysis.
B. Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
The 1983-1989 SCF panel contains information on 1479 households who were
29 We had some concern that the mix of defined benefit versus defined contribution pension
saving could vary with income, so that omitting one but including the other might bias our results.  We
therefore also examined net worth exclusive of defined contribution pension plans, and the results were
similar. 
30 Our SCF data set actually contains 2643 observations because each household's data is
repeated three times with different random draws of imputed variables, in order to more accurately
represent the variance of the imputed variables.  Thus, the standard errors in our analysis must be
corrected for the presence of replicates.  We do so by multiplying them by 1.73 — the square root of the
number of replicates (three).
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surveyed in 1983 and then again in 1989.  The sample has two parts: households from
an area-probability sample and households from a special high-income sample
selected based on tax data from the Internal Revenue Service. The SCF contains very
high quality information about assets and liabilities, as well as limited data on
demographic characteristics, and income in the calendar year prior to the survey. 
The saving rate variable used for the SCF calculations equals the change in real
net worth between 1983 and 1989 divided by six times 1988 total real household
income (all variables measured in 1989 dollars).  Because it spans several years, this
variable is likely to be a less noisy measure of average saving than a one-year
measure.  Net worth is calculated as the value of financial assets (including the cash
value of life insurance and the value of defined contribution pension plans), businesses,
real estate, vehicles and other nonfinancial assets, minus credit card and other
consumer debt, business debt, real estate debt, vehicle debt and other debt.  Although,
in principle, one could calculate the value of defined benefit pension plans and add
them to net worth, we do not attempt to do so.29
We restrict the SCF sample in several ways.  First, we exclude households with
1982 or 1988 income less than $1000.  Second, we eliminate households where the
head or spouse changed between 1983 and 1989 because such changes tend to have
dramatic and idiosyncratic effects on household net worth.  The resulting sample
contains information on 881 households.30 
C. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
The PSID is the longest running U.S. panel data set, and, as such, it provides a
valuable resource unavailable to researchers in the 1950s and 1960s.  The long
earnings history for each household helps us disentangle transitory and permanent
31 Capital gain in housing is the difference in net equity in the main home between 1984 and 1989
less the cost of additions and repairs made to the home between 1984 and 1989.  These gains are
restricted to those years in which the family did not move.  Financial capital gain equals the change in the
value of other real estate, farms, businesses, and stocks between 1984 and 1989 less net financial
investment (i.e. the net amount invested in these assets over this period.)  We do not correct the active
saving variable for inflation.
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income shocks, thus facilitating the key issue of identification.
For the asset supplements in 1984 and 1989, net worth is calculated as the sum
of the value of checking and savings accounts, money market funds, CDs, government
saving bonds, T-bills, and IRAs; the net value of: stocks, bonds, rights in a trust or
estate, cash value of life insurance, valuable collections, and other assets; the value of
main house, net value of other real estate, net value of farm or business, and net value
of vehicles; minus remaining mortgage principal on main home and other debts.  Net
worth does not include either defined benefit or defined contribution pension wealth.
We consider three different measures of the saving rate for the five-year period
between 1984 and 1989.  First, we use the change in real net worth (1989 dollars)
divided by five times average real after-Federal-tax money income for 1984 through
1988.  Second, we use an "active saving" measure designed by the PSID staff -- the
nominal change in wealth minus capital gains for housing and financial assets,
inheritances, and the value of assets less debt brought into the household; plus the
value of assets less debt taken out of the household.31  This measure should more
closely match the traditional income minus consumption measure of saving.  The
saving rate is computed by dividing active saving by five times the average real income
measure described above.  
Our third PSID saving measure adds estimates of saving through Social Security
and private pensions to active saving.  Feldstein and Samwick (1992) used then-current
(1990) Social Security legislation to determine how much of the payroll tax is reflected
in higher marginal benefits at retirement, and how much constitutes redistribution.  We
count the former part as the implicit saving component of the 11.2 cents in total Social
Security (OASI) contributions per dollar of net income.  In addition, if a household
worker is enrolled in a defined contribution plan, we count their own contribution as
saving (we have no data on employer contributions).  If a household worker is enrolled
32 Branch (1994) finds that the CEX income covers 85 to 90 percent of actual income (as
measured by the Current Population Survey) whereas the coverage ratios of most categories of
expenditures (relative to the NIPA aggregates) fall below that amount, with some ratios (e.g. purchases of
alcoholic beverages) well below 50 percent.  
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in a defined benefit plan, we include imputations of saving for representative defined
benefit plans, as provided by Gustman and Steinmeier (1989) (see Appendix A). 
We drop households who had active saving greater than $750,000 in absolute
value, and households who, during any year between 1984 and 1988, had missing
data, a change in head or spouse, or real disposable income less than $1000.  For the
regressions that include lagged or future earnings, we drop households for which there
was a change in head or spouse during the relevant years. 
D. Summary statistics from the three data sources
Table 2 shows summary measures of saving and income from the CEX, SCF,
and PSID.  All saving rates are on an annual basis, and all income figures are in 1989
dollars.  To avoid undue influence from extreme values of the saving rate when income
is close to zero, the “average” saving rates were calculated as average saving for the
group divided by average income for the group.  
The PSID “active” saving rates are generally the lowest in the table.  By contrast,
the estimates from the CEX — where saving is also based on the “active” concept — 
are among the highest.  The high levels of CEX saving have been noted by previous
authors (e.g. Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus, 1991) and probably reflect 
measurement error: both income and consumption are understated by respondents but
consumption is thought to be understated by a greater amount, lending an upward bias
to saving.32  The PSID change in wealth (excluding pensions) saving measure, which
includes capital gains and losses and adjusts for transfers in and out of the household,
is generally higher than the PSID active saving measure and in the same ballpark as
the similarly defined SCF measure.
We also calculate the saving rate averaged over the entire sample in each data
set, including younger and older respondents, to correspond most closely to an
aggregate rate of saving.  For comparison, the average NIPA saving rate is shown in
Table 2: Summary Saving and Income Measures
CEX SCF PSID
Y-C )Wealth )Wealth Active Active +
pension
Age
30-39
Median
saving
rate
.27 .05 .04 .04 .12
Average
saving
rate
.30 .03 .17 .15 .23
Median
income 
29,220 35,027 31,878 31,878 33,814
Age
40-49
Median
saving
rate
.26 .08 .03 .04 .15
Average
saving
rate
.30 .29 .33 .15 .24
Median
income
33,510 36,495 41,820 41,820 45,263
Age
50-59
Median
saving
rate
.26 .05 .07 .04 .19
Average
saving
rate
.30 .24 .32 .11 .24
Median
income
29,515 31,723 36,028 36,028 39,620
Aggregate average
saving rate (all ages)
.25 .18 .17 .08 n.a. (for
elderly)
Memo: 
NIPA saving rate over
corresponding period
.09
(1982-89)
.09
(1983-89)
.08
(1984-89)
Notes:
1. The CEX figures correspond to after-tax income; the SCF figures correspond to pre-tax income; the
PSID “change in wealth” and “active” figures correspond to after-tax income; the PSID “active+pension”
figures correspond to the sum of after-tax income augmented by employer contributions to Social Security
and pensions.  All income data are expressed in 1989 dollars.
2. Median saving rate equals median of the ratio of saving to income.
3. Average saving rate equals average saving divided by average income. 
33 Note, though, that our saving measures include purchases of motor vehicles, which should
boost them relative to the NIPA concept.
34 Income quintiles were calculated (on a weighted basis for the SCF and PSID) for each age
group separately to ensure comparability across data sets and within the U.S. population.  We did not use
population weights in the regression analysis because the SCF weights — especially those for the top of
the income distribution —  ranged by orders of magnitude, causing considerable instability in the
estimated coefficients.  For example, just three of the 107 households in the top 1 percent of the income
distribution accounted for 38 percent of the total population weights among the replicated sample.
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the final row -- conceptually, this rate is closest to the average “active” saving rate.33
V.  Empirical Results
A.  Saving Rates and Current Income
We begin our empirical inquiry by documenting the well-accepted fact that saving
rates increase with current income.  Table 3 summarizes how the saving rate varies
with respect to current income quintile for households between the ages of 30 and 59.34 
We estimate median regressions, with the saving rate as the dependent variable and
dummies for income quintiles and age categories as independent variables.  In each
case, we suppress the constant term and include dummies for all five income quintiles
and the 30-39 and 50-59 age groups so that the estimated coefficient for a given
income quintile corresponds to the saving rate for households in that quintile with heads
between 40 and 49 years old.  (Regressions that include interaction terms between age
and income variables are similar.)  Bootstrapped standard errors for the coefficients,
based on 500 replications, are shown in parentheses.
The first column of Table 3 shows that the saving rate increases dramatically
with measured current income in the CEX.  Among households with heads between 40
and 49, median saving rates range from -23 percent in the lowest income quintile to 46
percent in the highest.  We also calculate (but do not report) bootstrapped standard
errors for the difference in the saving rate of quintiles i and i-1, and use the symbol “ † ”
to indicate a statistically significant difference, based on a 95% confidence level and a
one-sided test.  All of the differences in this column are statistically significant.  To
summarize the quintile effects, we also report the coefficient from a regression of
saving rates on the level of income.  This coefficient suggests that a $10,000 increase
in income is associated with an 8 percentage point increase in the saving rate. 
Table 3: Median Regressions of Saving Rate on Current Income
Data Set --> CEX SCF PSID
saving     
measure -->
Y - C )Wealth )Wealth Active Active + 
pension  
Income
Quintile 1 
-.226
(.018)
-.015
   (.035)
.000
(.003)
.000
(.004)
.086
(.007)
Income
Quintile 2
.151 †
(.008)
.095 †
(.039)
.013 †
(.007)
.019 †
(.006)
.129 †
(.008)
Income
Quintile 3
.269 †
(.006)
.087
(.025)
.052 †
(.009)
.048 †
(.006)
.163 †
(.008)
Income
Quintile 4
.348 †
(.006)
.144
(.034)
.071
(.011)
.054
(.009)
.180 †
(.008)
Income
Quintile 5
.455 †
(.006)
.265 †
(.032)
.179 †
(.019)
.106 †
(.009)
.230 †
(.009)
Top 5% n.a. .368
(.096)
n.a. n.a. n.a.
Top 1% n.a. .494
(.051)
n.a. n.a. n.a.
Age 30-39 .006
(.005)
-.034
(.032)
.000
(.004)
.000
(.004)
-.031
(.007)
Age 50-59 -.002
(.007)
-.016
(.033)
.000
(.004)
.000
(.004)
.009
(.009)
Pseudo R2 .143 .041 .032 .028 .050
Coefficient on
income / 104
.079
(.001)
.017
(.003)
.024
(.002)
.013
(.001)
.020
(.002)
Sample Size 13050 727 2868 2868 2868
   •  Bootstrapped standard errors shown in parentheses.
   •  SCF and PSID quintiles are weighted; all regressions are unweighted.
   •  Definitions of income: CEX: current income; SCF: income in 1988; PSID: average income 1984-88.
   •  † indicates that coefficient is significantly greater than that for previous quintile, based on 1-sided 5% test.
35 We are able to estimate fairly precise saving rates for households in the highest part of the
income distribution because the SCF disproportionately samples high-income households – out of a total
of 727 households in the age 30-59 sample, 201 have income above the 95th percentile and 107 have
income above the 99th percentile.
36 The top quintile includes the top 5 percent, and the top 5 percent includes the top 1 percent. 
We do not test whether the saving rates for the top 5 percent or the top 1 percent are different from the
saving rates for the top quintile.
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Consistent with previous research based on the CEX, we estimate an extremely low
saving rate for the lowest income quintile; we believe this reflects appreciable bias from
measurement error in income and/or transitory income, as households in this quintile
presumably cannot sustain such a high rate of dissaving for very long (see Sabelhaus,
1993).
The second column shows results from similar regressions using SCF data,
including (annualized) saving rate estimates for households in the 95th and 99th
percentile of the income distribution.35  The slope of the relationship between the saving
rate and measured current income is smaller than in the CEX.  This result is not
surprising – the change-in-wealth saving rate is not subject to the upward bias
associated with measurement error in income, and many transitory movements in
income likely wash out over the five-year period covered by the SCF panel. 
Nevertheless, we see the estimated median saving rate rising significantly from
-2 percent for households in the bottom quintile to 27 percent for households in the top
quintile.  Saving rates are even larger for the richest households:  37 percent for those
in the top five percent of the income distribution and 49 percent for those in the top one
percent.36
Columns 3 through 5 show the relationship in the PSID between income and
three saving-rate measures: the (annualized) total change in wealth (Column 3), active
saving (Column 4), and active saving plus imputed pension and Social Security saving
(Column 5).  As in the SCF, the five-year period over which saving is measured reduces
the importance of transitory income (also note that we are able to average five annual
observations for income).  In all cases, we estimate a monotonic positive relationship
between saving and income, with differences of as much as 18 percentage points
between the highest and lowest income quintiles.
37 Among households aged 40-49 with any positive earnings, median Social Security saving as a
percent of pre-tax earnings ranges from 10.1 percent in the bottom income quintile to 4.2 percent in the
top quintile.  But when calculated as a percent of pre-tax earnings plus transfer income, median rates
range from 8.2 percent in the bottom income quintile to 4.1 percent in the top quintile.  (If we do not
exclude the zero-earnings households, the latter range is 7.8 percent to 4.1 percent.)
38 For example, among households 40-49, median Social Security saving as a percentage of
disposable income ranges declines from 6.5 percent for the lowest income quintile to 3.9 percent for the
highest income quintile.  However, Social Security plus pension saving ranges rises from 7.6 percent in
the lowest income quintile to 11.1 percent in the highest income quintile.
39 As mentioned previously, Gustman and Steinmeier (1997, tables 9 and 12, and 1999) use the
HRS to construct, for 51-61 year olds, a comprehensive measure of wealth that includes pension and
Social Security wealth.  They find that the ratio of the average comprehensive stock of wealth to average
lifetime earnings declines with lifetime earnings; this is surprising in light of our results that ratios of saving
flows with respect to income rise with income. In part, the difference can be explained by the fact that
transfer income, an important source of income for low earnings households, is included in our income
measure, but not included in theirs (see our footnote 37 above).  Another reason may be that very long
averages of lagged earnings could be imperfect measures of permanent income – as predictors of future
earnings, these averages likely overweight the distant past.  The finding in Gustman and Steinmeier
(1997) that even the ratio of financial wealth to lifetime earnings does not increase with lifetime earnings
deciles suggests mismeasurement of permanent income. 
40 Moreover, Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass (1999), Liebman (1999), and Gustman and
Steinmeier (2000) show that Social Security is less progressive when the calculations are based on
additional features not included in our model, such as life expectancies that are positively related to
income.
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Note that the differences in saving rates by income group for active saving
augmented by imputed pension and Social Security contributions (Column 5) are even
larger than those for active saving (Column 4).  This may appear surprising, given the
higher Social Security rates of return and replacement rates among households with
lower earnings.  There are two factors that explain this.  First, while imputed Social
Security saving rates as a percent of earnings are decreasing across income quintiles,
when Social Security saving rates are calculated as a percent of earnings plus income
transfers such as AFDC, disability and unemployment insurance, the decrease is
somewhat smaller.37  Second, saving through private pensions increases across
income quintiles, and this increase more than offsets the decline in Social Security
saving, so that median Social Security plus pension saving is generally higher in the top
quintile than in the bottom quintile.38  Thus it is unlikely that low rates of financial saving
and wealth accumulation among lower income households can be explained by higher
implicit Social Security and/or pension wealth accumulation.39,40
41 Because of non-linearities at very high levels of income, this regression excluded households
with income in excess of $500,000. 
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B. Saving Rates and Permanent Income
We now turn our attention to the relationship between saving rates and
permanent income, using the two-stage procedure described earlier.  We first focus on
consumption as an instrument.  Recall that the presence of measurement error (in the
case of the CEX) or transitory consumption (in all three data sets) will bias the
estimated slope toward a negative number. 
Column 1 of Table 4 shows results from the CEX.  The estimated median saving
rate rises from the predicted first to second quintile, but then remains fairly flat.  One
interpretation is that the results favor the Friedman proportionality hypothesis; the more
likely is that the negative correlation induced by measurement error in consumption and
transitory consumption is approximately offset by a positive correlation between saving
rates and permanent income.
We next consider data from the SCF and PSID, where saving is derived from the
change in wealth and is thus likely uncorrelated with consumption measurement error. 
The SCF does not contain direct consumption flow measures, but it does include
estimates of the value of vehicle stocks.  We use the value in 1983 as an instrument. 
As shown in column 2, the results based on this instrument are surprisingly similar to
those in the previous table, with saving rates rising from 3 percent in the lowest quintile
to 25 percent in the top quintile.  Saving rates in the top 5 percent are 44 percent of
income, and in the top 1 percent are nearly half of income. These results suggest that
the positive relationship between saving rates and income is even stronger for the
highest-income households.  The estimated linear impact of income on saving rates
(near the bottom of the table) is roughly 5 percentage points per $10,000 in income, but
is not statistically significant.41 
Although the PSID contains data on food consumption only, previous work using
other data sets has generally shown a monotonic relationship between total
consumption and food consumption.  Columns 3, 4, and 5 in Table 4 show that when
PSID food consumption is used as an instrument, the estimated saving rates
Table 4: Median IV Regressions of Saving Rate on Income 
using Consumption as an Instrument
Data Set --> CEX SCF PSID
saving
measure -->
Y - C )Wealth )Wealth Active Active + pension 
Instruments    
         ---->
Non-auto
consumption
Vehicles Food
consumption
Food
consumption
Food
consumption
Income
Quintile 1
.210
(.010)
.025
(.027)
.000
(.006)
.010
(.006)
.107
(.008)
Income
Quintile 2
.288 †
(.009)
.133 †
(.043)
.022 †
(.009)
.030 †
(.007)
.129 †
(.010)
Income
Quintile 3
.277
(.008)
.131
(.039)
.036
(.009)
.037
(.006)
.147
(.010)
Income
Quintile 4
.283
(.007)
 .163 
(.037)
.055 †
(.010)
.040
(.008)
.150
(.010)
Income
Quintile 5
.246
(.007)
.248
(.043)
.131 †
(.019)
.072 †
(.010)
.193 †
(.011)
Top 5% n.a. .443
(.105)
n.a. n.a. n.a.
Top 1% n.a. .496
(.127)
n.a. n.a. n.a.
Age 30-39 .006
(.006)
-.052
(.032)
.002
(.007)
-.003
(.006)
-.023
(.008)
Age 50-59 -.000
(.006)
-.009
(.032)
.000
(.008)
-.010
(.006)
.011
(.011)
Pseudo R2 .003 .026 .013 .010 .016
Coefficient on 
income / 104
-.003
(.002)
.052
(.038)
.024
(.003)
.013
(.002)
.015
(.002)
Sample Size 13050 727 2805 2805 2805
   •  Bootstrapped standard errors shown in parentheses.
   •  SCF and PSID quintiles are weighted; all regressions are unweighted.
   •  † indicates that coefficient is significantly greater than that for previous quintile, based on 1-sided 5% test.
42 In the first stage, we regress average current disposable income (1984-1988) on food
consumption in each of the years 1984-1987. 
43 In fact, we had earnings information back to 1967, but, conditioning on earnings in more recent
years, those earlier readings had little or no predictive power for income in 1984-88.
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consistently rise with income.42  Indeed, the saving rate shows a significant step-up for
roughly half of the quintiles.  The linear results at the bottom of the table are statistically
significant and quantitatively important, pointing to a 1-1/4 to 2-1/2 percentage point
increase in the saving rate for each $10,000 increment to predicted income.  
Our next approach uses as instruments lagged and future earnings.  For the
CEX, we have no data on lagged or future earnings.  For the SCF, we have only one
observation on earnings from outside the measurement period for saving: 1982 income. 
Column 1 of Table 5 shows that when this variable is used as an instrument for 1988
income, there is a very strong relationship between predicted income and saving rates,
with the very highest income groups saving half of their after-tax income.  Only one of
the differences is statistically significant, but the estimate from the linear equation (a 2
percentage point increase for each $10,000 in predicted income) is statistically
significant.
For the PSID, we use as instruments labor earnings of the head and wife
(combined) for each year from 1974 to 1978, or effectively 10 years before the period
over which saving is measured.43  Columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 5 show the results of
this approach for the three PSID saving measures.  In all cases, saving rates rise with
predicted permanent income.  The magnitude of the differences are in fact quite close
to those from the uninstrumented results in Table 3, suggesting that the simple five-
year average of current income eliminated transitory income quite effectively.  
The last three columns of Table 5 show that when future earnings (1989-91) are
used as instruments, we again see saving rates increasing with predicted income.  This
is true whether one looks at the quintile coefficients (ranging, for the active plus pension
saving measure, from 8 percent to 23 percent) or the coefficient from the regression on
predicted income (suggesting an increase of between 1-1/2 percentage points and
2-3/4 percentage points for each $10,000 increase in predicted income, with standard
errors around 1/4 percentage point).
Table 5: Median IV Regressions of Saving Rate on Income 
using Lagged and/or Future Earnings as Instruments
Data Set --> SCF PSID PSID
saving    
measure -->
)Wealth )Wealth Active Active + 
pension  
)Wealth Active Active +
pension 
Instruments      
       ---->
Lagged
Income
Lagged
Earnings
 Lagged 
Earnings
Lagged
Earnings
Future
Earnings
Future 
Earnings
Future
Earnings
Income
Quintile 1
.018
(.022)
.000
(.005)
.000
(.004)
.090
(.010)
.000
(.003)
.004
(.004)
.077
(.009)
Income
Quintile 2
.080 †
(.024)
.016
(.011)
.019 †
(.008)
.121 †
(.012)
.023 †
(.008)
.026 †
(.007)
.136 †
(.009)
Income
Quintile 3
.090
(.032)
.063 †
(.018)
.043†
(.010)
.169 †
(.016)
.066 †
(.010)
.047 †
(.007)
.163 †
(.011)
Income
Quintile 4
.152
(.032)
.075
(.017)
.055
(.013)
.193
(.014)
.070
(.012)
.053
(.009)
.182
(.010)
Income
Quintile 5
.234
(.033)
.111
(.033)
.080  
(.013)
.205
(.017)
.161 †
(.016)
.093 †
(.009)
.225 †
(.011)
Top 5% .436
(.094)
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Top 1% .502
(.045)
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Age 30-39 -.043
(.026)
.000
(.008)
.000
(.005)
-.033 
(.012)
.000
(.003)
-.004
(.004)
-.030
(.008)
Age 50-59 -.006
(.027)
.000
(.007)
.001
(.005)
.020
(.014)
.000
(.005)
-.004
(.005)
.013
(.012)
Pseudo R2 .040 .014 .019 .035 .028 .026 .052
Coefficient on
income / 104
.021
(.006)
.015
(.002)
.012
(.002)
.020
(.003)
.028
(.003)
.016
(.002)
.022
(.003)
Sample Size 727 1365 1365 1365 2487 2487 2487
  
   •  Bootstrapped standard errors shown in parentheses.
   •  SCF and PSID quintiles are weighted; all regressions are unweighted..
   •  SCF results use 1988 income as current income and 1982 income as lagged income.
   •  PSID results use 1974-1978 for lagged earnings and 1989-1991 for future earnings.
   •  † indicates that coefficient is significantly greater than that for previous quintile, based on 1-sided 5% test.
44 The median saving rate numbers plotted are the coefficients from the regressions in Tables 3 to
6.  The median income numbers are coefficients from median regressions of current income on income
quintiles and age dummies.
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One objection to our results in Table 5 is that even long lags (e.g. ten years) of
earnings could be tainted with transitory components if transitory effects are highly
persistent, with half-lives of two decades or more (for example, if the AR(1) component
of the error term is on the order of 0.90 or above).  We thus turn to education as an
instrument — a proxy for permanent income that is generally constant for adult
households. Table 6 presents results from median regressions of saving rates on
education group. For the top of the table, we do not use a two-stage procedure but
simply report the “reduced form” estimates of saving rate by education group.  We
suppress the constant and include dummies for two age groups (30 to 39 and 50 to 59)
and all education groups; the excluded age group is 40-49.  At the bottom of the table,
we report the coefficient on predicted income from a two-stage regression.
As shown in column 1 of Table 6, estimated median saving rates in the CEX
range from 16 percent for high school dropouts to 34 percent for college graduates,
with the differences statistically significant.  The range for the SCF (column 2) is
6 percent to 29 percent.  The positive correlation is also present in the PSID, with the
range depending on the saving rate measure; for example, the saving rate with imputed
Social Security and pension income ranges from 11 percent for high school dropouts to
20 percent for college graduates.  The differences between education groups are all
statistically significant.  The coefficients on predicted income for the PSID runs indicate
that the saving rate rises by between 2 and 3 percentage points for each $10,000
increase in income.
We summarize the results presented so far in figures 1A-1D. For each fitted
income quintile or education group we plot the median saving rate against median
income.44  The results are striking.  While the CEX shows considerable dispersion in the
relationship between saving rates and income (depending on how the income groups
were formed), for the PSID and the SCF, we see upward sloping lines that are
essentially the same across all choices of instruments and when no instrumenting is
done.  In sum, the results presented thus far strongly suggest that saving rates rise with
Table 6: Median Regressions of Saving Rate on Education
Data Set --> CEX SCF PSID
saving measure
-->
Y - C )Wealth )Wealth Active
Active +
pension 
No High School
Degree
.156
(.009)
.058
(.037)
-.001
(.004)
.016
(.006)
.107
(.005)
High School
Degree
.284 †
(.006)
.118
(.032)
.039 †
(.006)
.038 †
(.006)
.145 †
(.007)
College
Degree +
.342 †
(.007)
.290†
(.037)
.113 †
(.013)
.080 †
(.011)
.196 †
(.009)
Age 30-39 -.005
(.007)
-.065
(.034)
.001
(.006)
-.008
(.007)
-.028
(.006)
Age 50-59 .017
(.009)
.012
(.043)
.001
(.008)
-.010
(.007)
.012
(.011)
Pseudo R2 .017 .019 .014 .010 .0200
Coefficient on
income / 104
.068
(.003)
.008
(.002)
.032
(.003)
.018
(.003)
.023
(.002)
Sample Size 13050 727 2853 2853 2853
   •  Bootstrapped standard errors shown in parentheses.
   •  Regressions are unweighted.
   •  Definitions of income: CEX: current income; SCF: income in 1988; PSID: average income 1984-88.
   •  † indicates that coefficient is significantly greater than that for next lower education, based on 1-sided 5%
test.
Figure 1A: CEX saving rates
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Figure 1B: SCF saving rates
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Figure 1C: PSID saving rates
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Figure 1D: PSID saving rates
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lifetime income among working-age households.
C. Saving rates among older households
In this section, we consider how the relationship between saving and permanent
income changes at older ages.  Examining the question for older households is difficult
because observable measures of income may not be good indicators of lifetime
income, particularly if we pool together people who are still working and those who have
already retired.  For the CEX and SCF, we attempt to get around these problems by
restricting the sample to just the age group 70-79, where fewer than 15% of households
have heads or spouses that are still working more than 20 hours a week.  For the PSID,
we use a larger sample of households age 62 and older and directly restrict the sample
to just retirees; we also investigate how sensitive the results are to adding working
households to the sample.
Table 7 presents median saving rates by quintiles of current income and by
education.  Not surprisingly, there is a strong correlation between saving rates and
current income in the CEX (Column 1); what is more striking is the large and significant
correlation of saving rates with education (Column 2).  We use pension and Social
Security income to determine income quintiles in the SCF (Column 3).  The saving rates
are much less precisely estimated than those for younger households owing to the
smaller sample size.  There is no obvious pattern in saving rates among the bottom 4
quintiles, and even the 5th quintile coefficient is not significantly different from zero. 
The estimated coefficient for the top 1 percent of the income distribution, however,
remains very high, with saving equal nearly half of income.  The SCF results based on
education (Column 4) show a rising saving rate with education, but the results are not
statistically significant. 
Turning next to the larger sample in the PSID of people over age 62, we control
for the different range of ages, with the excluded age 70-79.  Column 5 restricts the
sample to retirees, with quintiles based on household income from pensions, Social
Security, and government welfare payments.  We see a modest but significant positive
correlation between income and saving rates, with no evidence of dissaving among any
Table 7: Median Regressions of Saving Rate on Income and Education
for Older Households
Data Set --> CEX
(Age 70-79)
SCF
(Age 70-79)
PSID
(Age 62 +)
saving
measure -->
(1)
Y - C
(2)
Y - C
(3)
)Wealth
(4)
) Wealth
(5)
Active 
(6)
Active
(7)
Active
Quintile 1 -.494
(.036)
... .127
(.310)
... .0
(.004)
.007
(.007)
...
Quintile 2 -.337 †
(.029)
... .339
(.362)
... .0
(.005)
-.008
(.006)
...
Quintile 3 -.137 †
(.018)
... -.027
(.120)
... .032
(.021)
.004
(.014)
...
Quintile 4 .049 †
(.018)
... -.110
(.148)
... .024
(.029)
.048 †
(.018)
...
Quintile 5 .319 †
(.012)
... .116
(.130)
... .061
(.029)
.060
(.023)
...
Top 5% ... ... .153
(.251)
... ... ... ...
Top 1% ... ... .448
(.260)
... ... ... ...
No High
School
... -.069 
(.015)
... .010
(.035)
... ... .0
(.004)
High School
Graduate
...  .027 †
(.032)
... .118
(.170)
... ... .020
(.016)
College
Graduate +
... .128
(.046)
... .228
(.160)
... ... .053
(.046)
Age 62-69 ... ... ... ... .0
(.004)
.008
(.007)
.0
(.006)
Age 80+ ... ... ... ... -.010
(.024)
-.014
(.019)
-.008
(.020)
Pseudo R2 .117 .092 .014 .005 .006 .012 .002
Coef.  on
income / 104
.167
(.009)
.099
(.018)
.035
(.025)
.063
(.060)
.025
(.010)
.032
(.008)
.013
(.008)
Sample Size 2969 2969 154 154 636 938 630
 
   •  Bootstrapped standard errors shown in parentheses.
   •  CEX: unweighted; SCF and PSID: quintiles are weighted, regressions are unweighted.
   •  Definitions of income: CEX: current income; SCF: pension and Social Security income in 1988; PSID:
pension, Social Security, and welfare income, 1984-88. 
   •  Columns (5) and (7) based on retired PSID households; column (6) based on all PSID households in age
range.
   •  † indicates that coefficient is significantly greater than that for next lower quintile or education group, based
on 1-sided 5% test.
45 We do not attempt to impute dissaving from pension and Social Security wealth, although we
suspect that these sources of dissaving are small.  Indeed, Bernheim (1987) argued that for life cycle
consumers who carry positive wealth in other forms and are reasonably far from the maximum length of
life, annuities should be discounted roughly at the interest rate, without any reference to life expectancy. 
Under this approach, the present value of Social Security and pension benefits does not decline over time,
implying no dissaving from these sources.
46 For this sample, using transfer income to create quintiles imparts a downward bias on the
estimated correlation between income and saving rates because people who haven’t retired will be
receiving earnings (and presumably saving some of those earnings for retirement) but will likely receive
below-normal Social Security and pension benefits. 
47 See also Alessie, Lusardi, and Kapteyn, 1995, Hurd, 1990, and Feinstein and Ho (2000).
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group.45  Column 6 considers median saving rates for the same age group, but includes
those who are still working, as retirees may represent a select group of savers.  Income
quintiles were determined again by transfer income rather than total income.46  The
results are very similar to those seen in the more restricted sample; a modest increase
in the saving rate from zero in the lowest income quintiles to about 6 percent in the top
quintile.  The relationship between education and saving rates is also positive in the
PSID (Column 7) but insignificant and less pronounced than in the CEX and SCF. 
Taken together, the results provide no evidence that older high lifetime income
households dissave at a faster rate than older low lifetime income households; if
anything they may continue to save more.47  
VI.   Discussion
This paper revisits an old question:  Do high lifetime income households save a
larger fraction of their income than low lifetime income households?  This question was
the topic of heated and largely inconclusive debates in the 1950s and 1960s.  We have
approached it with three data sources: the Consumer Expenditure Survey, the Survey
of Consumer Finances, and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  For households
aged 30-59, we consistently find that higher lifetime income households save a larger
fraction of their income than lower income households.  Also, there is no evidence that
high lifetime income households dissave more at post-retirement ages.  
Which model is right?
Our results clearly rule out models that imply saving is proportional to permanent
income.  But, as shown in Section II, a variety of economic models deliver the prediction
48 Huggett and Ventura (2000) show that a life-cycle model with homothetic preferences, earnings
uncertainty, and a realistic Social Security system can generate saving rates that rise with income,
matching the patterns found in U.S. data by early researchers.  The variation in saving rates in their model
is due primarily to differences in Social Security replacement rates across earnings groups and
differences in earnings across age groups. 
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that saving rates are positively related to permanent income.  Is there any way to
distinguish among these?
First, our results are not consistent with life-cycle explanations based on
differences in the timing of income or consumption.  With regard to the former, we find
that including imputed Social Security and pension saving does not alter our basic
result that high income households save a larger fraction of their income.  The decline
in Social Security saving rates as income rises is more than offset by a rise in pension
saving rates, so that including imputed Social Security and pension saving leads to a
steeper relationship between saving rates and income.  Because we find that saving
rates rise with income even after controlling for age and Social Security, we argue that
models such as Huggett and Ventura (2000) that rely primarily on differences in Social
Security replacement rates are not capable of fully explaining why high income
households save more.48
More generally, we find no evidence of a “switching” pattern at later ages; that is
household types with higher saving rates while young are not more likely to have higher
dissaving rates while old.  If anything, our point estimates suggest that higher income
households continue to save more than low income households while retired, albeit with
a smaller differential. 
Precautionary saving models with uncertain medical expenses cannot explain
the evidence either, since lower income households typically face more uncertainty
about health costs relative to their income.  However, adding means-tested social
insurance yields predictions that are more consistent with empirical patterns,
particularly if the medical expenditures are large and are associated with poor health
very late in life.  In this case, the dissaving of the old would either occur very late in life
or not at all (accidental bequests).  
Higher saving rates for higher income groups are also consistent with an
operative bequest motive as in Becker and Tomes (1986); indeed, the very high saving
49 See Bernheim, Skinner, Weinberg (1997).  Mulligan (1997) has also criticized this simple
“bequest-smoothing” explanation for another reason; he found no evidence suggesting that households
giving (or receiving) bequests are more likely to smooth consumption across generations.  The Mulligan
model treats the bequest motive as endogenous; parents who spend more time with their children (and
less time working for pay) develop stronger altruistic feelings towards their children.  Thus our finding that
the rich save more and bequeath more is consistent with the Mulligan model to the extent that the income
effect (higher wage households have more money to leave to their children) offsets the endogenous taste
effect (higher wage parents spend less time with their children).
50 This ranking of priorities is also generally consistent with stated motives for saving in Japan
(Horioka and Watanabe, 1997) and in the Netherlands (Wärneryd, 1995). 
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rates of the top 1 percent or top 5 percent are difficult to explain any other way. 
However, while our model with bequests alone might explain the saving of the rich, it
predicts life cycle saving for low income households, which is at odds with the very low
observed levels of saving (and dissaving) in the lowest income quintiles.49  We thus
suggest a general model that includes a precautionary saving motive tempered by the
presence of a safety net, coupled with a bequest motive.  The different motives need
not be exclusive:  households may save for precautionary reasons but with a
reasonable expectation that they will be able to pass along unspent balances to their
children (also see Smith, 1999a).
This view of saving behavior can potentially reconcile seemingly inconsistent
survey results on bequest behavior.  For example, 43 percent of retired households in
the 1983-89 SCF panel cited either “in case of illness” or “emergencies” as their most
important reasons for saving, while fewer than 5 percent mentioned “for the children.”50 
At the same time, 20 percent of the retired sample said it was likely that they would
leave a “sizable” estate to their heirs (also see Laitner and Juster, 1996), and 55
percent of retirees responded that leaving an inheritance was either very important or
important.  In Horioka, et al (2000), 46 percent of U.S. households with children
indicated that they wanted to make efforts to leave a bequest behind, while 51 percent
indicated they would leave to children “whatever assets happen to be left over.” 
Together, this suggests that households would like to leave money to their children, but
recognize that the primary motive is to ensure their own (and their spouse’s) financial
solvency until death.
Returning to a stylized fact noted in the introduction, our results can be
consistent with the lack of times-series increase in the aggregate saving rate, as our
51 As an illustration, we calculate wealth levels at age 60 by dividing our sample into the three
education groups, and using the estimated age-specific active saving measures from Table 6, an interest
rate of 3 percent, and perfect certainty education-specific earnings profiles from Hubbard, Skinner, and
Zeldes (1994).  For high school dropouts, with a present value of lifetime earnings equal to $490,750, the
ratio of wealth to average income at ages 56-60 is 0.72; for high school graduates, the ratio is 1.90; and
for college graduates with lifetime earnings of $953,630, the ratio is 3.54.
52 See, for example, Mieszkowski and Palumbo (2000) and Chernick and Reschovsky (1997).  We
ignore behavioral effects of the tax reform.  Note that the regressivity on a lifetime income basis will be
less than that calculated on an annual basis.  See, for example, Poterba (1989).
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preferred theoretical model implies that saving rates are invariant to increases in
income, health care expenditures, anticipated income of heirs, and the size of the
consumption floor over time, as long as all variables rise proportionately. 
What are the policy implications?
Our results have implications for the “choice versus chance” question first raised
by Milton Friedman (1953) and more recently by Venti and Wise (1998).  Is the
considerable variation in accumulated wealth the consequence of choice (preferences
and tastes) or chance?  Venti and Wise argue that much of the variation in wealth
within lifetime income groups is due to saving decisions (choice).  Our findings suggest
that differences in saving behavior across income groups are also an important source
of the overall variation in wealth of the U.S. population.51 
In addition, our results have implications for the progressivity of consumption
taxes.  There are two reasons that the progressivity of a consumption tax might differ
from that of an income tax.  First, even in a life-cycle model in which everyone ends life
with zero wealth, if high income households save more when young (and dissave more
when old), they will have higher interest income over their lifetimes.  Therefore, on a
lifetime basis, a flat rate consumption tax will be less progressive (or more regressive)
than a flat rate income tax.52  A simple simulation by education group that uses our
estimated median active saving rates from Table 6 (as in footnote 51) to generate
education-specific wealth and interest income profiles suggests that, through age 80,
the ratio of interest income taxes paid to lifetime resources is four times larger for
college-educated households than for high school dropouts.  
Second, bequests are effectively exempt from a consumption tax (at least for the
current generation), but are not exempt from an income tax.  If high income households
53  The Menchik and David (1982, 1983) U-shaped pattern may be the consequence of using
Wisconsin probate records matched with tax returns; farmers are more likely to show low or zero after-tax
income but leave sizeable farms.  The Menchik and David bequest assumptions are also used in Fullerton
and Rogers (1993) and Altig et al (1997), implying that these highly sophisticated tax incidence models do
not allow higher income households to save a higher fraction of income over their lifetime.
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leave proportionately more bequests than low income households, this will further
decrease the progressivity of a consumption tax relative to an income tax.  Menchik and
David (1982), found a U-shaped relationship between the fraction of resources
bequeathed and lifetime income; indeed bequests were the largest share of lifetime
resources for the lowest income decile.  When Metcalf (1994) used this bequest
pattern, he found that the adjustment for bequests increased slightly the progressivity of
a consumption tax.53  By contrast, our results suggest that elevated levels of
bequeathable wealth (as a fraction of income) among high income elderly people are
likely to translate into higher bequest-to-income ratios as well, making a consumption
tax more regressive.
There is much that remains to be learned about household saving behavior.  In
particular, future research should be targeted at improving our understanding of the
saving behavior of elderly households, especially following serious illness or the death
of a spouse.  Still, we believe that our work has established one fact: the rich do,
indeed, save more. 
33
Appendix A: Data Description
I.  CEX Data
We used data from Nelson's (1994a) reorganization of the CEX, which provides
expenditure, income, and demographic information for a cross-section of households.
The extract contains the 1980-89 waves, but we excluded the first two years because of
concerns about data quality.  We were left with a sample of households whose final
interviews fell between the first quarter of 1982 and the final quarter of 1989.  
The CEX is conducted on a quarterly basis.  Nelson aggregated the expenditure
information so that each household’s data correspond to spending for the full year of
participation.  The demographic information (and income information) in the Nelson
data set generally pertain to each household's final survey.  See Nelson (1994a) for a
detailed discussion of her data extracts as well as the limitations of the CEX data. 
A. Deflating
All expenditure and income variables were deflated using the chain-type price
index for personal consumption expenditures (Economic Report of the President 1997,
table B3), adjusted to have a base year of 1989.
B. Constructed Variables
     1. Consumption.  We defined consumption as total household expenditures plus
imputed rent for homeowners minus mortgage payments, expenditures on home
capital improvements, life insurance payments, and spending on new and used
vehicles.  The measure is similar to the National Income and Product Accounts
concept, except that it excludes purchases of new cars and life insurance
payments and includes property tax payments.  Also note that medical care
consumption equals only out-of-pocket spending (less reimbursements).
     2. After-tax Income.  Following Nelson, gross (pre-tax) income equals the sum of
workman's compensation, veteran's benefits, dividends, royalties, estate and
trust income, pension and annuities, welfare and public assistance, food stamps,
interest on savings accounts and bonds, net income or loss from boarders, net
income or loss from other rental units, alimony or child support, other money
income, salary income, nonfarm business income, farm income, Social Security
and railroad retirement income, and supplemental security income.  The figures
correspond to the 12 months preceding each household’s final interview.
After-tax income equals gross income minus taxes paid (federal, state and
local, personal property and other taxes, net of refunds).  Nelson cautions that
the tax data are even less reliable than the income data.  
The after-tax income of fewer than 1 percent of the households in
Nelson's extract was topcoded, with one or more of the underlying components
of income exceeding $75,000 (if the final interview occurred before the end of
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1982) or $100,000 (if the final interview occurred later).  We included these
cases in our sample, setting nominal after-tax income to the topcoding cut-offs.
     3. Saving Rate.  The saving rate equals the difference between real after-tax
income and real consumption, all divided by real after-tax income.
     4. Age.  The age variable pertains to the male head of household if present;
otherwise it pertains to the female head of household.  
     5. Education.  The education variables are based of the number of years of
education reported by the male head of household if present; otherwise, those
reported by the female head.  Households were put in the "no high school
degree" group, the "high school degree only" group, or the "college degree"
group, depending on whether the head reported less than twelve years of
schooling, at least twelve but less than sixteen years of schooling, or at least
sixteen years of schooling, respectively.
C.  Weights
The CEX includes probability weights in the quarterly samples, but Nelson
(1994a, Section V) warns that “When using observations from a period other than a
calendar quarter (or after having subjected the observations to demographic or data
quality selection criteria), use of these weights is not clearly justifiable.  Most
household-level analysis will ignore these weights”.  Accordingly, we do not use the
CEX weights.
D.  Sample Selection
After excluding the early waves from Nelson's reorganization, we were left with
32606 households.  We then eliminated 10670 households whose heads were less
than 30 years old, between 60 and 69 years old, or over 79 years old.  We next
dropped 3156 households whose members did not participate in the complete set of
surveys.  We then removed 419 households for whom some key expenditure data were
missing, 2163 households whose income data were coded as unreliable, 175
households whose real after-tax income was less than $1000 and 4 households for
whom real after-tax income was missing.  (Often missing data was simply entered in the
survey as a zero, see Nelson, 1994a).  We were left with 16019 households in our non-
retired sample.
II.  SCF Data
We use data from the 1983-89 SCF panel.  Households were interviewed about
their assets and liabilities, employment, income, and demographics in 1983 and then
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again in 1989.  Respondents fall into one of two groups: the area-probability sample,
which was designed to provide good coverage of assets and liabilities that are broadly
distributed in the population, and the "list" sample, which was compiled from IRS tax
records and designed to provide estimates of assets and liabilities held by relatively
wealthy households.  Our analysis includes both groups so we were able to obtain
relatively precise estimates for households at the top of the income distribution.
A. Deflating
All wealth and income variables were deflated using the chain-type price index
for personal consumption expenditures (Economic Report of the President 1997, table
B3), adjusted to have a base year of 1989.
B. Constructed Variables
     1. Saving Rate.  The (annualized) saving rate equals real net worth in 1989 less
real net worth in 1983, all divided by six times real income in 1988.
     2. Net Worth.  Net worth equals the value of checking accounts, savings accounts,
certificates of deposit, savings bonds, money market accounts, cash/call money
accounts, trusts, life insurance (cash value), homes, land contracts, other real
estate, vehicles, thrift plans, IRAs, stocks, bonds, loans owed to the household,
business assets, and "other" financial and nonfinancial assets, minus the value
of credit card debt, lines of credit debt, vehicle debt, mortgage debt, other real
estate debt, consumer debt, business debt, and "other" debt.
     3. Income.  Household income equals the sum of wages and salaries, net business
income, income from non-taxable investments, other interest income, dividends,
capital gains from the sale of stocks, bonds or real estate, rental income, trust
income, royalties, unemployment insurance, worker's compensation, child
support, alimony, income from AFDC, SSI and other forms of assistance, Social
Security income, other pension income, and "other" income.  The SCF contains
no information about taxes paid.
     4. Age.  The age variable pertains to the age of the "head" of household in 1986. 
In the SCF, the head is defined as the respondent (selected as the person "most
knowledgeable" about household financial affairs) unless the respondent was
female and had a male spouse present in the household.  In this case, the
"head" is defined as the respondent's spouse.
     5. Education.  All education groupings were done according to the number of years
of education reported by the head in 1989.  Households were put in the "no high
school degree" group, the "high school degree only" group, or the "college
degree" group, depending on whether the head reported less than twelve years
of schooling, at least twelve but less than sixteen years of schooling, or at least
sixteen years of schooling, respectively.
54 The PSID has released a 1994 wealth supplement data file. This contains information on 1994
wealth, as well as a revised version (with new imputations) of the 1984 and 1989 wealth numbers.  We do
not use the 1994 wealth numbers because the 1994 family and individual files are still in early release
form, and many of the variables needed to construct income, education, and consumption measures are
not available.  The 1994 supplement did not provide revised estimates of active saving.  To make our
change in wealth estimates consistent with our active saving estimates, therefore, we continue to use the
1984 and 1989 numbers reported in 1989. 
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C.  Weights
All calculations were weighted with the variable WGT0296, which was developed
explicitly for the purpose of estimating changes in wealth between 1983 and 1989.
D. Sample Selection
The SCF panel data set contains information from 1479 households.  The data
set has 4437 observations because each household's data was repeated 3 times with
noise added to any imputed variables, in order to more accurately represent the
variance of these imputed variables.  We excluded 1260 observations (i.e. information
about 420 households) because the heads were younger than 30, between the ages of
60 and 69, or over 79.  We then eliminated another 573 observations (i.e. information
about 191 households) because the head or spouse had changed between the 1983
and 1989 interviews.  Finally, we removed 12 observations (i.e. information about 4
households) because their incomes in 1982 or 1988 were less than $1000.  We were
left with 2643 observations with information from 881 households.
In order to correct our standard errors for the presence of the replicates in the
data set, we multiplied them by 1.73--the square root of the number of replicates (3).  
III.  PSID Data
We use data from the PSID from 1968-92 in final release format.  The 1989
survey contains a wealth supplement which gives detailed information on wealth
accumulation from 1984-89.54 
A.  Deflating
All variables except the food consumption variables and the active saving
variable are deflated using the chain-type price index for personal consumption
expenditures (Economic Report of the President 1997, table B3), adjusted to have a
base year of 1989.  We deflate food consumed at home and food consumed out of the
home with the CPI-U’s for food consumed at home and for food consumed out of the
home, both adjusted to have a base year of 1989.  The CPI’s correspond to the first
quarter of the relevant year, as we assume that households base their responses on
current food consumption (as opposed to that in the previous year). 
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B.  Constructed Variables
1.  Saving.  We use three measures of saving.  
a) Change in wealth. This variable equals the difference between real net
worth in 1984 and real net worth in 1989, where net worth includes the
value of checking and savings accounts, money market funds, CDs,
government saving bonds, T-bills, and IRAs; the net value of: stocks,
bonds, rights in a trust or estate, cash value of life insurance, valuable
collections, and other assets; the value of main house, net value of other
real estate, net value of farm or business, and net value of vehicles; minus
the remaining mortgage principal on main home and other debts.  Net
worth does not include either defined benefit or defined contribution
pension wealth.
b) Active saving.  The “active saving” variable was constructed by the
PSID staff.  It is equal to the change in wealth (1984 to 1989), adjusted for
passive increases or decreases in wealth (such as capital gains).  Capital
gains were not asked directly however, so the measure is built up in part
from questions about saving flows.  Rewriting the definition of active
saving in the PSID codebook (to ignore entries that are both added and
subtracted) we get: 
active saving = 
+ the value of private annuities purchased since 1984 (v17340) 
-  the value of private annuities or pensions cashed in since 1984(v17343)
+ the value of real estate purchased since 1984 (v17346) 
-  the value of real estate sold since 1984 (v17349) 
+ the cost of additions or repairs to real estate since 1984 (v17352) 
+  the amount invested in business or farm since 1984 (v17355) 
-   the value of farm or business sold since 1984 (v17358) 
+  the amount of stock purchased since 1984 (v17365) 
-   the amount of stock sold since 1984 (v17368) 
+  the value of assets less debts removed by movers out of the family unit
since 1984 (v17371-v17373) 
+  the value of debts less assets added by movers into the family unit
since 1984 (v17379-v17377) 
+  the value of vehicles in 1989 (v17320) 
-   the value of vehicles in 1984 (v17592) 
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+  the value of cash assets in 1989 (v17329) 
-   the value of cash assets in 1984 (v17601) 
+  the net value of other assets in 1989 (v17332) 
-   the net value of other assets in 1984 (v17604) 
+ the remaining mortgage principle in 1984 (v10020) 
-  the remaining mortgage principle in 1989 (v16326) 
+  the value of other debt in 1984 (v17607)
-  the value of other debt in 1989 (v17335).
Imputation procedures were used by the PSID staff when
respondents failed to provide an estimate of a wealth component or when
they could only provide a range of values.  We do not deflate the active
saving variable.  
c) Active saving augmented by Social Security and pension saving.  
Social security saving: 
We began with Feldstein and Samwick’s (1992) imputation
methods for determining what fraction of Social Security payroll
contributions can be considered saving.  Along the three relevant
segments of the AIME schedule, they calculated Social Security net
marginal tax rates, equal to the payroll tax minus the present discounted
value (using a 4% real discount rate) of marginal benefits.  Net marginal
tax rates were calculated at each age for single women, single men, and
couples, and were corrected for average life expectancy and spousal
benefits.  (We are especially grateful to Andrew Samwick, who provided
us with detailed tables of these net tax rates.) In some cases the Social
Security net marginal tax rate is positive (the 11.2 cent payroll tax yielded
an increase in the present value of benefits less than 11.2 cents) and in
some cases it is negative (i.e. the 11.2 cent payroll tax yielded an increase
in the present value of benefits greater than 11.2 cents). 
Assigning single households to the appropriate group was
straightforward (single males, single females).  For couples the problem is
more complex, since couples may benefit more by receiving spousal
benefits rather than gaining credit for a lower-paid spouse’s individual
contributions.  Thus we used earnings of the highest paid spouse (male or
female) when the lower-paid spouse earned less than 40 percent of the
higher-paid spouse.
We constructed social-security-eligible earnings by excluding
earnings above the taxable limit in any of the 5 years 1984-89.  We then
averaged these eligible earnings across the five years.  Next, we
integrated the Feldstein and Samwick net marginal tax rates along the
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AIME schedule to measure the Social Security net average tax rate for
the specific household.  Dollars of Social Security saving equals 11.2
percent minus the net average tax rate, multiplied by eligible earnings.
Households that pay a net average tax have Social Security saving less
than 11.2 percent of earnings, while households that receive a subsidy,
(e.g. some lower income households, that are accumulating largely along
the first, 90 percent AIME schedule) have Social Security saving greater
than 11.2 percent of earnings. We add this Social Security saving to the
reported PSID saving.
Pension saving: 
Finally, we consider the imputation of pension benefits.  The PSID
asks about employee contributions toward defined contribution plans. We
start with the answer to:  “On the average, what amount or percent of pay
have you contributed over the last five years since 1984?” and multiply
this by average labor income from 1984-1988 to get a dollar amount of
saving.  We do this for the contributions to all defined contribution pension
plans with the current employer (exclusive of IRAs, which are included
elsewhere) for both the head and spouse.  If a household answered that
they contributed to a DC plan, but did not report the percent, we set the
percent equal to 5.5.  We do not include contributions from previous jobs
held during this period because of concerns about double counting of
contributions and because we don’t know the length of the period of
contributions (test results that included these contributions did not
materially differ from those reported). We have no data on employer
contributions to defined contribution plans.
Defined benefit plans are more complicated, since there are often
quite complex accumulation rules.  However, Gustman and Steinmeier
(1989) used the detailed pension information from the 1983 SCF Pension
Provider Supplement to calculate the implicit returns to average DB plans
at that time.  While they did not report implicit contribution rates by income
group, they did provide such rates by age group.  For PSID households
that indicated that they have a DB plan, we use their calculations to add to
our measure of saving accumulation in defined benefit plans (see their
Table 13 on page 85).  Implicit accumulation rates range from less than 6
percent of labor income before age 35 to 18 percent (briefly) around age
50 back to 5 percent prior to retirement.
2.  Disposable Income.  Disposable income is constructed by subtracting Federal
taxes paid by the head and wife and Federal taxes paid by other members of the
family unit from total family money income.  Total family money income is the
sum of taxable income of the head and wife, taxable income of other members
of the family unit, transfers of the head and wife, and transfers of other members
of the family unit.  Taxes paid are estimated by the PSID staff based on taxable
income, number of dependents and exemptions, filing status, estimated standard
and itemized deductions, estimated earned income tax credits, and estimated
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elderly tax credits.  All nominal components of disposable income are deflated
using the implicit price deflator described above.  Average disposable income is
calculated for 1984-88 (1985-89 survey years). We calculate an additional
measures of average disposable income to use with the broader saving measure
described above.  This measure starts with the above measure of disposable
income and adds 1) one half of Social Security saving to average disposable
income (1984-88), to correct for the fact that the employer contribution to Social
Security is not measured in the conventional definition of income, but is
measured as part of our augmented Social Security saving, and 2) the imputed
employer-contribution to defined benefit and/or defined contribution plans, for the
same reason. 
3.  Saving Rates. We calculate the saving rates by dividing active saving and the
change in wealth by five times average disposable income from 1984-88.  Our
broader saving measure is divided by five times the corresponding average
disposable income measure.
4.  Food Consumption. We use food consumption as a proxy for total
consumption since the PSID does not ask more general consumption questions. 
We follow Zeldes (1989) in the construction of food consumption. In survey years
1977-87 and 1990-92, the question on food consumed at home was designed to
exclude the amount saved from food stamps. To measure total annual food
consumed at home we add the annual food consumed at home constructed by
the PSID staff and (when appropriate) the annual amount saved from food
stamps.  This variable is deflated by the home food consumption deflator
described above.  Annual food consumed out of the home is deflated by the
appropriate measure for food consumed out of the home.  Total real annual food
consumption is the sum of total real annual food consumed at home and annual
real food consumed out of the home.
Since questions on food consumption were omitted from the survey in
1988 and 1989, we use food consumption in 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987 as our
instruments.
5.  Education.  We consider education of the head in 1989 only.  The sample is
divided into 3 education categories: no high school degree, high school degree
only, and college degree.  Observations are coded “no high school degree” if
they have 0-11 years of schooling and they have not received a high school
degree.  Observations holding a high school degree, a high school degree and
non-academic training, or a high school degree and some college attendance
(but no college degree) are coded “high school degree only”.  Finally
observations holding a college degree or a college degree plus advanced
training are coded “college degree”.  
6.  Lagged Earnings  Here we describe two complications in calculating lagged
after-tax earnings. The first relates to correcting for taxes on labor income.  We 
calculate the average tax rate equal to taxes paid by head and spouse divided by
41
taxable income of head and spouse. After-tax labor income of the head and
spouse is equal to pre-tax labor income multiplied by (1 minus the average tax
rate) plus transfers of the head and spouse.  
The second complication relates to maintaining the same head-spouse
combination throughout the period in which we calculate lagged earnings.  In
order to ensure that the head-spouse combination is the same in each year in
which lagged earnings are calculated as in the 1984-88 period, we set after-tax
earnings to missing in a given (lagged) year if the head-spouse combination is
not the same as in the following year.  This is done recursively starting in 1983
and ending in 1968.  For example, if the head-spouse combination changed
between 1980 and 1981, all after-tax earnings from 1980 back to 1968 would be
set to missing.  This ensures that we only include lagged earnings as
instruments for households whose head-spouse combination is the same across
all years.
7.  Future Earnings.  We calculate after tax future earnings by the same method
described above for lagged earnings.  Specifically, after-tax labor income of the
head and spouse is equal to pre-tax labor income multiplied by (1 minus the
average tax rate) plus transfers of the head and spouse.  To ensure that the
head-spouse combination is the same throughout the period in which we
calculate future earnings (1989-91), we set after tax earnings to missing if in a
given (future) year the head-spouse combination is not the same as in the
previous year.  In this case, we care about whether the head-spouse
combination is the same going forward from 1988, rather than backward (as with
lagged earnings).  
C.  Weights
All quintiles were calculated using the 1989 family weights from the PSID (V17612).
D.  Sample Selection
We use the family-individual file from the PSID, and each individual constitutes
an observation.  We start with a sample of individuals who were heads for at least one
year between 1968 and 1994 (19914 observations).  We then restrict the sample to
individuals who were heads for at least one year between 1968 and 1992 (1987
observations dropped) and who were heads in all years from 1984 to 1989 (12740
observations dropped).  We further restrict the sample to observations who had no
change in family composition affecting the head between 1984 and 1989 (7
observations dropped).  We drop households whose head was less than 30 years old in
1987 (767 dropped).  For all but Table 7,  we also drop households whose total real
after-tax money income in any year from 1984-88 was less than $1000 (for a total of 66
dropped), and households with the absolute value of active saving above $750,000 (3
observations dropped).  Finally, for all but Table 7 we drop households whose head
was older than 59 in 1987 (1126 dropped) and households whose head-spouse
combination changed over the 1984-89 period (351 dropped).  The sample is restricted
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further in that we drop observations whose income or education measure used in the
one and two stage regressions is missing.  In the one stage regression using current
income quintiles, no observations are dropped.  In the one and two stage education
regressions, 15 observations are dropped.  In the two stage regression using food
consumption as an instrument, 63 observations are dropped.  In the two stage
regressions using lagged and future income (separately) as instruments, 892 and 381
observations are dropped, respectively. 
For Table 7, we begin by dropping observations who were working during the
1984-89 period (3510 dropped).  Then we drop observations whose head was less than
70 years old in 1987 (472 dropped) and observations whose head-spouse combination
was not the same from 1984-89 (25 dropped).  We also drop households whose total
real money income in any year between 1984-88 was less than $1000 (see above for
variable numbers, 2 dropped) and households who had an absolute value of active
saving greater than $750,000 (1 dropped).  Finally, in the education regressions we
drop observations whose education level is missing (1 dropped).  No observations had
missing data for the quintile regressions and thus no observations were dropped. 
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